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INTRODUCTION
We designed this session with the aim of making archaeologists more
aware of the potential of Bayesian methods for the quantitative analysis of
archaeological data.
Cowgill’s paper is mainly programmatic, arguing that archaeologists
have been, for the most part, slow to take advantage of these possibilities.
The papers by Millard and Gowland and by Zink each demonstrate some
new applications. The topic of the paper by Hermon and Niccolucci is not
strictly a Bayesian application, but their use of fuzzy set theory is conceptually
related because it also offers a nuanced way of dealing with uncertainty. It is
especially interesting, and rather disconcerting, to observe how large the
differences are in the classifications generated by five expert scholars, using
the same set of objects. Sophisticated quantitative techniques cannot help us
much if we do not give far more attention than is usually the case to the
reliability and validity of the typological “data” used as input for quantitative
techniques.
The papers in this section should help to make archaeologists more
aware of the potential advantages of Bayesian methods, but probably the
largest obstacles at present are the scarcity of widely available and easily
usable software, and the very limited discussions of Bayesian methods in
introductory textbooks on quantitative methods in archaeology (at least this
is so as regards textbooks in English). The major exceptions are programs for
combining multiple radiocarbon dates and stratigraphic information, but even
these remain rather esoteric for most archaeologists.
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GETTING BAYESIAN IDEAS ACROSS TO A WIDE AUDIENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
I can understand how people may have reservations about Bayesian
methods on the grounds that it can be difficult to find manageable math-
ematic expressions that do justice to one’s prior knowledge and beliefs, and
that in many cases the required computations may be excessively difficult.
However, I cannot comprehend how it could not be obvious to everyone that
the general Bayesian attitude – which I take to be that it is highly desirable to
interpret new information in ways that explicitly and formally take account
of prior knowledge and beliefs – is preferable to the attitude that prior knowl-
edge and beliefs should have no place in the inferences drawn from any spe-
cific data set. This perhaps puts me at a disadvantage because if I could see
how the latter attitude might make sense, then I could think of ways to frame
arguments against it, rather than merely exclaiming that it’s obvious that the
Bayesian attitude makes more sense. As it is, I’m rather baffled by the fact
that it doesn’t seem to be obviously more reasonable to everyone, and I am at
a loss to know how to construct arguments that will convince those who
don’t find the superiority of the Bayesian attitude self-evident. It is also dis-
quieting that many statisticians who are vastly more experienced and tal-
ented than I am resist Bayesian approaches. However, I am heartened by the
fact that other statisticians, equally or even more able than the first group, as
far as I can tell, are strong advocates of Bayesian methods.
Beginning about 1962, for some years I taught introductory statistics
courses in which I dealt with inference using the Neyman-Pearson approach,
as best I understood it. This always seemed to me a rather austere and un-
natural intellectual self-discipline, standing in much the same relationship to
everyday reasoning as learning the moves and postures of classical ballet re-
lates to just walking. Nevertheless, it seemed that this was the only way to do
it, if one were to use statistical inference competently and correctly. It was
probably always the most difficult and challenging part of the course for
both me and students – far harder than teaching them how to plug numbers
into formulas and compute a correlation coefficient or a chi-square statistic
or the like – and a high proportion of students never really got it. Basically,
the Neyman-Pearson approach to inference enables us to compute the prob-
ability of an observed sample statistic, if it were the case that the correspond-
ing population parameter had some specified value, but it prohibits us from
saying anything about the probability that the population parameter has any
particular value, given that the sample statistic has a particular observed value.
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This is supplemented with some rather murky (at least to students in an
introductory course) considerations about the “power” of the test. In prac-
tice it was very difficult to get students to see how to make good use of the
power concept, and virtually impossible to keep them from drawing conclu-
sions about the probability of the population parameter, even though this
was supposed to be a major “no-no.” This made them “closet” Bayesians, but
quite unskillful Bayesians.
I no longer recall when I first became aware of the Bayesian approach
to inference, but I think that from the beginning it was like a great light
dawning (like one of those light bulbs in the cartoons), and I was rather
embarrassed that I had accepted the Neyman-Pearson doctrine as long as I
had. So, as I say, it was unclear to me why everyone else exposed to Bayesian
concepts should not become an instant convert. In the case of sophisticated
statisticians, this is still unclear to me. For the relatively unsophisticated –
and this includes all but a tiny handful of archaeologists – I suspect that a
main source of resistance is that they never really understood the logic of
Neyman-Pearson inference very well, but it provided the rituals they were
taught to believe were founded on unchallengeable truths emanating from
higher authorities (i.e., professional statisticians who really understood all
those arcane symbols) and which could thus legitimize their conclusions. For
this reason, they are uncomfortable about and suspicious of any alternative
that they don’t understand very well either, but which they have heard is
controversial, and which asks them to unlearn a good deal of what (with
considerable effort and pain) they have already managed to learn. Others
(e.g. SHENNAN 1998) seem rather critical of formal statistical inference alto-
gether. If I understand correctly, he advocates computing relatively uncontro-
versial descriptive statistics, then drawing conclusions intuitively. This is, in-
deed, often better than drawing unwarranted conclusions from poorly un-
derstood methods of formal inference. Particularly important is that it moti-
vates us to try harder to obtain results whose patterning is so pronounced
that formal tests of significance and formal confidence intervals are superflu-
ous. Nevertheless, this approach fails to make good use of the possibilities of
well-done formal inference in cases where the patterning is not so obvious.
I am not equipped to try to overcome resistances of trained statisticians
to Bayesian attitudes. However, I can offer suggestions about how to get Bayesian
ideas across to the much wider audience of relatively unsophisticated users of
statistical methods. I suspect that an effective way to do this would be to write
a truly introductory textbook that framed concepts of inference in Bayesian
terms from the beginning. As concepts I do not think they are terribly difficult
– in fact, I think they should be easier to grasp than the Neyman-Pearson con-
cepts (or precepts). It is also desirable that such a book should emphasize esti-
mation and confidence (or credibility) intervals more than hypothesis-testing.
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Especially important is that it should give examples of Bayesian methods that
are (a) applicable to classes of problems of real interest to nearly all archaeolo-
gists and (b) either require only very simple computations or can reliably and
reasonably quickly get good results from widely-available computer packages
that will run on standard desktops. Not surprisingly, I have drafted sections of
such a book in preliminary form, although it remains to be seen whether I will
ever follow through on this project. If I don’t, someone else should. As an
introductory book, much of it will necessarily cover topics such as descriptive
statistics in ways not much different from the multitude of other introductory
texts, and it will also have to deal with inferential statistics for which no easy
Bayesian methods or nice computer programs yet exist.
2. BAYESIAN INFERENCE WITH AN UNINFORMATIVE PRIOR
I think that Bayesian inference with an uninformative prior should give
students a logically coherent basis for what they tend to do, but incoherently,
when they are trying to do classical inference. That is, rather than computing
P(data|hypothesis) and then interpreting it as P(hypothesis|data), one recog-
nizes that Pposterior(H|D) is proportional to L(D|H)Pprior(H), and, if one has good
reason to think that Pprior(H) is essentially flat over the relevant range of H, this
becomes Pposterior(H|D) is proportional to L(D|H). The student should be made
aware that (a) you have to justify the assumption that Pprior(H) is essentially flat,
and (b) if you can justify a more informative distribution of Pprior(H), and (c)
this more informative distribution is mathematically tractable, you are missing
an opportunity if you don’t take advantage of this more informative prior.
3. USING AN INFORMATIVE PRIOR TO IMPROVE ESTIMATES OF TRUE POPULATION
PROPORTIONS
One good example of a mathematically simple Bayesian method that
very often applies to questions of archaeological interest is that of using the
proportion of objects of a particular category in a collection to estimate the
proportion of that category in the larger population represented by the sam-
ple. For example, if p is the observed proportion of type X is a given collec-
tion, what is a good estimate of π , the proportion of type X in the population
represented by the sample, and what is an appropriate credibility interval for
this estimate of π? In many cases, a beta distribution expresses our prior
information quite well, and it is very easy to compute. IVERSEN (1984) goes
into using a beta prior at some length, and he gives formulas for combining a
beta distribution that captures one’s prior information with one’s sample
data, to compute a posterior beta distribution that usually has a narrower
credibility interval than either the prior distribution or a distribution com-
puted from the sample data alone. These computations are quite easy. Never-
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theless, his book, however elementary it may seem to statisticians, is far too
advanced for most archaeologists. Much of what I think needs to be done in
an introductory exposition is recasting what Iversen says in far more elemen-
tary terms and giving the mathematical and statistical background that he
presupposes. It would also be desirable to give various examples of archaeo-
logical applications, such as those of ROBERTSON (1999, 2001).
One complication with the beta prior arises when one’s prior estimate
of p is quite different from the observed sample proportion, p, and both have
fairly narrow credibility intervals. For example, suppose we are working in a
region and time interval for which prior work has given us good reason to
believe that type X constitutes 60 to 80% of the relevant sherd populations
of nearly all sites in this region during this interval. A straightforward appli-
cation of the methods described by Iversen would be to say that the mean of
the prior probability distribution of π, µprior, is 0.7, and that it has a standard
deviation (σprior) of 0.05. This means that the variance of the prior probabil-
ity distribution will be (0.05)2, or 0.0025. Plugging these values into equa-
tions given by IVERSEN (1984, 23) gives values for the constants aprior and bprior
of 58.1 and 24.9, respectively1. That is, the prior beta distribution is the
product of a normalizing coefficient (whose value need not be computed)
times π58.1-1(1-π)24.9-1, or π57.1(1-π)23.9.
Suppose further that in a given collection of 200 sherds, which we have
good reason to think reasonably approximates a simple random sample of the
population of all sherds at a site within the given region and pertaining to the
given time interval, only 60 of these sherds are of type X. That is, for this
sample, p = 0.30. Using the binomial distribution, the probability that p = 0.3
when πprior = 0.7 and the sample size (n) is 200, is π
60(1-π)140, times another
normalizing coefficient, whose value also need not be computed. Multiplying
this probability by the prior probability function, we can simply add exponents
of terms and get, for the posterior distribution, also a beta distribution, a dif-
ferent coefficient times π57.1+60(1-π)23.9+140, or π117.1(1-π)163.9. For this posterior
distribution, apost = 118.1 and bpost = 164.9. Plugging these back into Iversen’s
equations, we obtain µpost = 0.417, σ
2
post = 0.000856, and σpost = 0.0293. That
is, we are practically sure that, for this particular collection, the true value of p
is somewhere between 0.36 and 0.47, most likely about 0.42.
Is this really sensible? The posterior probability distribution for p for
this particular sample is quite different from both our prior distribution for p
and the observed sample proportion, and there is almost no overlap in the
credibility intervals. Should we be happy with this result? I found that stu-
dents generally weren’t, and they tended to give “wrong” interpretations of
1 aprior = µprior{[µprior(1-µprior)/σ
2
prior]-1} and bprior = (1-µprior){[µprior(1-µprior)/σ
2
prior]-1}.
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cases like this example. Basically, what they were saying, although they didn’t
express it this way, was that they didn’t actually think the above prior distri-
bution applied after all. At first I thought they just hadn’t gotten the Bayesian
logic, but eventually I came to think they were acting more sensibly than I
was. Something really does seem to be wrong here.
Tentatively, I think the problem is that a beta prior works pretty well as
long as observed samples are small or observed proportions in large samples
are not terribly different from µprior (or both, of course). But when the observed
proportion in a large sample is more than about 2σprior away from µprior, the
shapes of the tails of the beta distribution become very important, and they
may do a very poor job of capturing our prior knowledge or beliefs. In such
cases, some other distribution may work much better. We might, for example,
begin with the idea that type X usually constitutes 60% to 80% of the relevant
populations, but there is some small, but not tiny, probability that type X could
be anywhere from 0% to 100% of a population. This might be expressed for-
mally as the sum of two beta distributions, the one discussed above, plus an-
other one that is flat over the interval from 0 to 1, with constants chosen to
reflect one’s prior relative belief about the proportion of populations for which
p is probably between 0.6 and 0.8, relative to the proportion of populations in
which we think p could be just about anything. We might, for example, believe
that there is about a 95% probability that π is between 0.6 and 0.8, but we
think the remaining 5% probability is evenly spread across the intervals 0 to
0.6 and 0.8 to 1. In effect, this would be like a beta distribution with heavy and
flat tails. Since each of the two terms in this sum is a beta distribution, it seems
we would get a posterior distribution that is also the sum of two beta distribu-
tions, so the computations should not be difficult. Obviously we have more
difficulty in specifying our prior, since, in addition to µprior and σprior, we also
have to have some basis for postulating a prior value for the ratio of the in-
formative and uninformative beta distributions. That is, there are three para-
meters, rather than just two, that depend on prior information, and one’s choice
of a value for this third one may be particularly difficult to justify.
This is where my thinking now stands, for better or worse, on this
complication about using beta priors to estimate proportions of categories of
objects within populations. I hope I have made the issue clear, and I would
greatly appreciate suggestions and comments from those more skilled in these
matters than I am.
4. GOOD USE OF MULTIPLE RADIOCARBON DATES AND OTHER INFORMATION TO ESTIMATE
DATES
Using multiple radiocarbon dates together with other information, such
as stratigraphic sequences, is a prime example of an important problem that
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has become manageable by means of computer methods. Numerous papers
by Buck and others (e.g., BUCK et al. 1996) illustrate these methods. I do not
have the competence to discuss them in any detail, and I am happy to leave
such discussions to those actively developing these methods.
GEORGE L. COWGILL
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ABSTRACT
A generally Bayesian attitude toward statistical inference seems to me so obviously
superior to the “classical” Neyman-Pearson approach that it is difficult to comprehend
why not everyone agrees. I believe that most non-statisticians learn classical procedures
ritualistically but then interpret their results in naively Bayesian ways. It would be better
if they became more sophisticated and knowing Bayesians. A truly introductory text on
the logic of Bayesian inference, with some simple but useful applications, would prob-
ably help. Bayesian inference with an uninformative prior may yield the same results as
classical inference, but with coherent rather than muddled logic. An example of a very
useful but mathematically simple archaeological application of an informative prior is
using prior information to improve estimates of true proportions of artifact categories in
populations represented by small collections. However, a complication arises when the
observed proportion in a fairly large sample is well outside the range considered at all
likely for the relevant population, based on prior information. In this case, straightfor-
ward use of a beta prior distribution can yield results that seem unreasonable. Possibly
our prior information is better represented by a modified beta distribution with “heavy”
tails. Advice about this problem would be appreciated.
